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Abstract: Network Security is play very important role in Network system, Because in networked systems, the major security 
risks occur while  conducting business on the Net; The following are some of the security risks occur: unauthorized access,  
Eavesdropping,  Password  sniffing,  spoofing-spoofing,  Denial  of  Service,  virus  attack,  System  modification,  Data 
modification, Repudiation, E-mail bombing. Not With data storage and processing snowballing into a necessity from being an 
eﬃcient part of any business process or organization, the need for securing storage at various degrees of granularity is gaining 
considerable  interest.  The challenge  in  designing an  encrypted  ﬁle  system  stems   from  balancing  performance,  security 
perception, ease of usage and enterprise level deploy ability. Often, the most secure solutions may not even  be the best 
solution either due to hit on performance or due to decreased usability. Further, narrowing the trust circle to exclude even 
hitherto trusted system administrators makes creating an encrypted ﬁle system a huge engineering exercise.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Data  security  has  become  a  very  important  issue 
with  growing  dependence  on  storage  systems and
increasing reliance on the internet for communication.
The key factors of interest for a deployment of a storage
solution are security, performance and usability. Further,
administering networks and storage over thousands of
systems spread over employees in companies with large 
head counts is an increasingly diﬃcult task. With
growing number of outsourcing industries,  such usage
conditions are becoming very common. These industries
are usually  attributed with high attrition rates. A  system 
administrator who may be trusted with proprietary data is
a diﬃcult task. Theft of data by employees who may later
cross-over to competitors is  another concern. While 
companies commonly impose restrictions like not
allowing USB thumb drives in oﬃces, these restrictions 
have been eﬀective in preventing data thefts and  are 
generallyinconvenient.
Security is a greater concern in defense establishments,
where secrecy of data is of paramount importance. Most
data thefts are found to be rooted at collusion with system
administrators. Similar examples are present in other
government organizations. Most users  in this kind of
environment are non-experts who require ease of usability 
of any  new solution provided. The pressing need is to
develop storage solutions which may provide a
heightened  security barrier. All trust the system
administrator.
2. RELATED WORK
Approaches to  Designing Encrypting File        
systems
2.1 Encryption Layer
This decides where the actual encryption/decryption
operations are performed on the  contents of a ﬁle
during the write/read process from the disk to memory.
This would decide where data remains in plain text in
the various stages in which it exists on the system, like 
buﬀer cache, page cache. The criterion is important
because while some of these buﬀers are  per-process, 
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others are per-system and therefore aﬀects other elements 
of design.
2.2 Granularity and Encryption
This refers to the smallest unit which uses the same
encryption key. This may be whole ﬁlesystems as in the
case of Cryptographic File System (CFS), or a per-ﬁle
key as in eCryptfs. It is also necessary to decide what
elements are stored encrypted on the disk. The objects in 
question  are  ﬁle data,  metadata, ﬁle system  based 
information etc.
2.3 Algorithm
This refers to the choice of using symmetric key or
quantum key based algorithms.  Symmetric key
algorithms provide better speed while quantum key
based algorithms provide  greater authentication &
security by means of robust key management scheme.
A trade-oﬀ between  the  two also  brings  up  using a
combination of these algorithms.
2.4 Key Management
The design needs to specify the format and location in
which the keys are stored. This may be  the  metadata 
of  the  ﬁle  or  the  ﬁle system  information  in  the 
uperblock  as  two examples. Also, an important design
decision is whether the keys are per-ﬁle, per-user or per-
system.
3. KERNEL CRYPTO API
The  kernel  crypto  API  additions  are  essentially 
designed  to  serve  the  requirements  of TransCrypt,
the implementations are towards developing a generic
API. However, omission of certain features from this
generic API is either due to the lack of their necessity
for  TransCrypt or for the sake of a simplistic
implementation.
3.1  TransCrypt’s Cryptographic Requirements
in the Kernel
While  several  standard  user  space  libraries  exist  for 
both  symmetric  and  asymmetric  cryptographic
operations in the user space the kernel cryptographic
functionality has so far been  restricted  to  symmetric 
key  operations.  TransCrypt  requires support for
following cryptographic functionalities.
1. Symmetric Key Operations. These operations are
already implemented in the kernel. In TransCrypt these 
operations are for blinding,  data block
encryption/decryption, securing communication with the
PKS, extracting FSK from super block.
2. Public  Key Operations. TransCrypt  requires 
encryption  with  public  keys  for  token creation  and  
establishing  secure  session  establishment  with  the 
PKS.  We  also need compatibility with  PKCS#1 
standards while creating secure cipher text.
3. Certificate Parsing and Verification. As public
keys are stored in the user space, there authenticity is
verified in the kernel by using certificate chains signed
by trusted root CAs.  We therefore need certificate
parsing and verification routines in the kernel.The earlier
works  had added RSA encryption and decryption 
services for a fixed modulus size 1024. The 
implementation took as input a 1024-bit integer A and
created a cipher text C by doing the  modular 
exponentiation.
C= Ae mod n
Here e is the public key while n is the modulus. In our
case, n is taken as 1024. However, the  input A is
usually smaller than 1024 bits.
3.2 PKCS#1 compliance
Asymmetric cryptographic operations require
implementation of four routines - encrypt with  public
key of recipient, decrypt with private key of receiver,
sign with private key of signer and verify with public
key of signer. While TransCrypts current design
requires the public encrypt and verify operations, our 
implementation includes all four functions to provide a 
generic functionality. We implement two padding 
schemes as laid out in version 2.1 of PKCS#1.
3.2.1 Encryption using Public Key
We implement two padding schemes as outlined in
PKCS#1 version 1.5 and the OAEP padding detailed 
in version 2.1 of the PKCS#1 document. Once the
padding is done we  perform  a  RSAEP  to  create  the
cipher text.
3.2.1.1 Version 1.5 Padding
The plain text block (encoded message), EM
corresponding to a message M looks like the following:
EM= 0x00 _ 0x02 _ PS _ 0x00 _ M
Here, PS is a padding string of non-zero octets of
length k− message length −3
k is the length of modulus in octets. In our case, this is
equal to 128(or 1024 bits). The function which performs
this padding is called EME PKCS V1 5 ENCODE.
3.2.1.2OAEP Padding
PKCS#1 version 2.1 lays out a more
comprehensive padding scheme called the Optimal 
Asymmetric Encryption Padding(OAEP). The scheme 
is shown in figure 5.1. The figure has been borrowed 
from the version 2.1 of PKCS#1 draft.
The function  is  called  EME  OAEP  ENCODE.  The
implementation of the encoding scheme is as follows.
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DBis generated by the following concatenation:
DB= lHash _ PS _ 0x01 _ M
Here, M is the message to be encrypted. PS is a
zeroed padding string of length
k− (message length) − (2 ∗hashlength) −2.
Again, k is the length of modulus in octets. In our 
scheme, this translates to 86 − (message length)
  A random seed is generated of length equal to the 
length of hash.
Figure 3.1: Schematic description of OAEP Encoding
Scheme. lHash is hash of label L. PSis padding strong of zero 
octets.
  A mask of length equal to DB is generated using
the mask generating function. The  mask generating
function is outlined later. We call it dbMask. The
mask generating function generates mask using seed as
the input. We create masked DB by XORing DB with 
the mask generated above.
maskedDB = DB ⊕dbMask
  We  generate  a  mask  of  the  length  of  seed 
with  maskedDB  as  input  called  the seedMask. We
then create maskedSeed by XORing with seedMask.
maskedSeed = seed ⊕seedMask
3.2.2Decryption using Private Key
The message is first decrypted using RSADP operation.
The obtained block is then decoded  to  retrieve the 
message.
4. APPROACH OF PAPER
In the next chapter we discuss other encrypting
ﬁlesystems and establish the need for a new encrypting  
ﬁlesystem  by using  Quantum  Cryptography. We
outline the architecture of TransCrypt. We also
discuss the security framework for TransCrypt. Then in 
next  chapter we discuss  about  Authentication technique 
architecture of  quantum  cryptography.  We provide
implementation details in later when we develop our
thesis. In chapter 5 we take an insight of the future work
on TransCrypt System by quantum crypt and ﬁnally
provide our conclusions.
Current implementation of TransCrypt looks for user’s
PKS only on the FS and not on WS  where user is
logged in. This can be solved by registering user’s PKS
with the FS kernel. FS kernel will store this location and
during subsequent file operations, authentication
messages  will be sent  to  the users registered  PKS 
location.
This section describes an approach to solve the attacks
when users access files over network from a workstation 
using NFS.
4.1 User masquerading attack
NFS is prone to user masquerading attack. Hence
processes of the attacker session can have the UID same
as that of the genuine user (usr). UID based
authentication is not sufficient to  protect TransCrypt
volume from this attack. FS kernel must have
mechanisms to differentiate between the genuine session
and a masqueraded session in order to mitigate this
attack. To differentiate  between  these  two  sessions, 
we  need  to  establish  some  unique  credentials 
between the user login process and the FS kernel.
During any file access, these credentials will also be
sent to the FS. FS kernel will verify these credentials
and give access to only those operations coming from a
genuine user. Since the masqueraded sessions won’thave
the correct credentials, it won’t get access to the files.
4.2 Man-in-the-middle attack
This attack is solved by establishing a session key
between the WS and the FS. All further communication 
between the hosts will go encrypted with this
symmetric key along with message integrity code. The
attacker cannot hav e this session key and hence cannot
interpret the  messages  or  modify  them  without  being 
noticed.
4.3 Replay Attack
This attack is solved by sending the file operation
responses to the genuine user, encrypted with a freshly
generated session key. Only the genuine user will have
the correct credential and the session key. These keys
(session key and credential) are established at log in
time to maintain the freshness so that replay attacks are
avoided.
5. QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
The standard cryptography of today depends on
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intercepting and reading our messages. In quantum
cryptography, we use the laws of  physics for the
exchange of keys to protect the confidentiality of our
messages over an insecure channel.
There are two requirements for secure data transmission. 
The first is the secure transmission  of the encryption
key.  One possibility for this transmission is to use
quantum particles.  The  second  requirement  is  an
encryption  key that  consists of  random  bits. There  are
two principal  quantum encryption protocols,  BB84 and 
entanglement.
5.1 The Theory behind Quantum Cryptography
A photon has a property called polarization and that
property can measure. The polarization of a particle is
the direction in which the wave is oscillating. Crucially
the polarization can be measured either rectilinearly or
diagonally.
5.2 BB84 Protocol
BB84 was the first ever quantum encryption schema.
Light is composed of discrete packets, called photons.
Each photon has an intrinsic property called
polarization, which can take one of four values (vertical, 
horizontal, left and right circular).
5.3 Spin and Polarization
We have already stated that photons exhibit spin.
Polarization is the spin propensity of a  photon. A
photon has an electric and magnetic fields represented
by vectors perpendicular both to each other and the 
direction of travel. The behavior of the electric field
vector determines the polarization of a photon.
5.4 Quantum Coding Scheme
As described  in  the  previous  section,  polarization 
and  measurement  of  polarization  of photons can be
done with the use of Polaroid. For the purpose of
evolving a simple coding scheme, let us consider only
the rectilinear and diagonal polarization schemes. This
gives us  4 directions  of  polarization  of a photon.  See
figure below.
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Figure: Mapping of quantum digits to binary digits
Bit 0 = photon with horizontal polarization or by a
photon with polarization at 45 degrees to the horizontal 
direction.
Bit 1 = photon with vertical polarization or by a
photon with polarization at 135 degrees to  the 
horizontal direction.
So, using the above qubit representations, a BB84
transmission for the binary 11010011 could look like
this:
Table 5.1– Qubit transmission & binary digit selection
Alice : Bits 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
Alice : Qubit ↕ ↕ ↔ ↕ ∕ ∕ \ ↕
Bob  : Scheme + X X + + X X +
Bob  : Qubit ↕ \ \ ↕ ↔ ∕ \ ↕
Bob  : Bits 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
Key Selection √ √ √ √ √
5.5  Quantum Key Distribution:  The Basics and      
Implementation
Quantum key distribution rests on two principles. The
first principle is itself one of the fundamental principles
in quantum mechanics. The second principle is purely
classical in nature.
6. SCOPE OF WORK
The TransCrypt ﬁlesystem was designed and a proof of
concept was presented in our earlier work. We provide
the key management scheme by using QKD (Quantum
Key Cryptography)  for TransCrypt  in  this  work.  This 
involves design of storage for cryptographic metadata in 
the  ﬁlesystem, metadata creation,  metadata extraction
while opening encrypted ﬁles and metadata management.
We also provide the kernel  cryptographic
algorithms  necessary for  implementing this  key
management scheme.
We also detail communication with user space utilities
which has been done in association with another work 
of our group. Some of the salient features of this work 
are:
•Providing support for handling cryptographic metadata.                           
•Providing a TransCrypt version with full ﬁlesystem and
ﬁle lifecycle.
• Addingassociated cryptographic support.
• Providing user space support modules.COMPUSOFT, An international journal of advanced computer technology, 2 (3), March-2013 (Volume-II, Issue-III)
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• Communication framework with user space utilities.
7. FUTURE WORK
TransCrypt is currently at an  advanced     
implementation stage. Some future goals of the 
project are enlisted.
• Integrity Support. Adding integrity support for
ﬁles to ascertain if ﬁles have been tampered with
or not. The  metadata may also be signed to
ensure that user tokens have not been changed.
• Data  Recovery Agent.  For  TransCrypt to be
enterprise deployable,  it should provide
recovery agent. The design of the recovery agent
has partially been outlined.
• Backup Support.TransCrypt, though implemented
over ext3 ﬁlesystem, does not handle journaling
modes.  Investigating and designing backup and
recovery is another goal for an  enterprise 
deployable encrypting ﬁlesystem.
• Smart Card based PKS. While TransCrypt has
from its inception talked about smart card based
key acquisition. Smart Card based PKS is a very
important future work.
• Group  Support.  TransCrypts  design has no
provision of Groups, an essential and useful 
feature of GNU/Linux and has wide ranging usage
in enterprises. Group support addition should be
done to TransCrypt keeping in view the issues of
scalability  while still maintaining  the  features  of 
security, transparencyand ﬂexibility.
• Integration with Trusted Platform Module.  The 
recent advent of Trusted Plat- form module
(TPM) should be incorporated in TransCrypt. These
may be used to avert attacks like malicious kernel 
image or modules being loaded.
8. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have presented an enhanced
architecture of TransCrypt, providing a comprehensive
key management scheme. TransCrypt walks over the
ﬁne line between usability and security. The design is
an attempt to provide ﬂexibility, transparency with a
height-ended security paradigm. We identify certain
attacks, notably daemon masquerading which
Transcript is susceptible to. These attacks are of denial
of service nature as opposed to attacks which may lead
to data theft.
Attacks leading to data theft are only possible through
sophisticated techniques like changing the kernel image,
screening the whole memory. We do not consider these
attacks a threat for  our  aim which  is  to  provide  an 
enterprise class encrypting ﬁlesystem.
The major contribution of this work is implementation
of a full ﬁle and ﬁlesystem lifecycle.  It  also  presents 
implementation  of  user  space utilities  to  support 
TransCrypt  operations.  Another contribution is
cryptographic additions in the kernel which were needed
for Tran-sCrypt. However, these additions have been
aimed at providing a common asymmetric API and 
public key infrastructure in the kernel space.
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